Everyone is familiar with the current buzz word that is Cloud Computing, and hopefully most of you that have some security interest with cloud have visited Craig Balding’s Website Cloud Computing Security. Now Craig has created a LinkedIn group for news and discussions on Cloud Security, so if your interested, have questions to ask, and knowledge to answer then I recommend you take a look.
Steven J. Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson, Mike Bond from Cambridge University have been researching chip and pin that we are all familiar with in this country on our payment cards. EMV (Europay, Mastercard and Visa came up with the standard) is the protocol used with payment cards worldwide, but they are most common in europe.
EMV is used to secures the payment card transactions by authenticating the person and card. This is done with a combination of the authorisation codes, digital signature, and of course then the pin entry. Chip and Pin was introduced to reduce fraud with card payments, that previously relied on the signature on the reverse of the card for person verification.
They work of the guys at Cambridge University have identified and documented a flaw in the EMV process that allows a fraudster to make payments with a genuine card, without knowing the correct pin.
This obviously is a significant issue, and is not something specific to the issuing bank, but the card process in general.
Cambridge University have released a paper with information on their study, and it makes for an interesting read. Obviously it does not disclose the specifics, but I think a few of us will have some idea of how this functions.
Document Conslusion Extract:
In this paper we have shown how the PIN verification feature of the EMV protocol is flawed. A lack of authentication on the PIN verification response, coupled with an ambiguity in the encoding of the result of cardholder verification as included in the TVR, allows an attacker with a simple man in-the-middle to use a card without knowing the correct PIN. This attack can be used to make fraudulent purchases on a stolen card. We have demonstrated that the live banking network is vulnerable by successfully placing a transaction using the wrong PIN. The records indeed falsely show that the PIN was verified successfully, and the money was actually withdrawn from an account. Attacks such as this could help explain the many cases in which a card has supposedly been used with the PIN, despite the customer being adamant that they have not divulged it. So far, banks have refused to refund such victims, because they assert that a card cannot be used without the correct PIN; this paper shows that their claim is false. We have discussed how this protocol flaw has remained undetected, due to the public specifications being not only complex, but also failing to specify security-critical details.
Finally, we have described one way in which this vulnerability may be fixed by issuer banks, while maintaining backwards compatibility with existing systems. However, it is clear that the EMV framework is seriously flawed. Rather than leaving its member banks to patch each successive vulnerability, the EMV consortium should start planning a redesign and an orderly migration to the next version. In the meantime, the EMV protocol should be considered broken.
Obviously this is not good, it is however concerning to read that people who fall victim to these sort of attack are not being reimbursed for their loss.
These guys have done some good interesting work, I just hope the industry takes this on board and makes the appropriate improvements.
of the EMV protocol is flawed. A lack of authentication
on the PIN verification response, coupled with an ambiguity
in the encoding of the result of cardholder verification as
included in the TVR, allows an attacker with a simple manin-
the-middle to use a card without knowing the correct PIN.
This attack can be used to make fraudulent purchases on
a stolen card. We have demonstrated that the live banking
network is vulnerable by successfully placing a transaction
using the wrong PIN. The records indeed falsely show
that the PIN was verified successfully, and the money was
actually withdrawn from an account.
Attacks such as this could help explain the many cases in
which a card has supposedly been used with the PIN, despite
the customer being adamant that they have not divulged it.
So far, banks have refused to refund such victims, because
they assert that a card cannot be used without the correct
PIN; this paper shows that their claim is false.
We have discussed how this protocol flaw has remained
undetected, due to the public specifications being not only
complex, but also failing to specify security-critical details.
Finally, we have described one way in which this vulnerability
may be fixed by issuer banks, while maintaining
backwards compatibility with existing systems. However, it
is clear that the EMV framework is seriously flawed. Rather
than leaving its member banks to patch each successive
vulnerability, the EMV consortium should start planning a
redesign and an orderly migration to the next version. In the
So we know its been on the cards for a while, and now its happened. What am I on about, the Browser Choice Screen for XP, Vista and W7 users in Europe.
Microsoft ships its OS with Internet Explorer, and some people are not happy about this, so things need to change. The answer is a selection screen so users can choose from a selection of other browsers easily.
So if you keep your machine up to date your going to see this High Priority Update (KB976002).
Once this update has been applied and you reboot your machine and you open your beloved Internet Explorer (assuming its your current default browser) you get taken to http://www.browserchoice.eu/BrowserChoice/browserchoice_en.htm where you get presented with various options of browsers to install and use. Its not clear to me how this will be displayed on all users machines, so this is just my experiance.
The browsers up for grab are – Avant, Chrome, Firefox, Flock, Green Browser, Internet Explorer, K-meleon, Maxthon, Opera, Safari, Sleipnir, Slim.
Personally I dont think this is going to make a great deal of difference. Most people who are tech savy will be using another browser if it suits them, and those that are not will most likely stick with what they know given the choice.
Time will tell in the future, once more stats come out in the next few months.
Most of you who visit my blog on a regular basis will be familiar with Microsoft Security Essentials, its Microsoft’s free AV & Malware scanner and its not half bad.
Well now there is another version… Security Essentials 2010. Its not so much about cleaning up your system, its more about the screwing up your computer and charging you for the privilege. Its the usual scamware type software we have seen before on the AV front, but this one seems to be rather successful with such a similar name to Microsoft’s offering.
Below are some screen shots of the scamware, and the real Security Essentials offering to help you tell the difference. Remember, if its asking you to pay, then step away.
The real Microsoft Security Essentials:

Fake Security Essentials 2010:

If you have been unlucky enough to install this scamware, then you may notice you are unable to visit any of the common legitimate AV software vendors to help clear up your system, as well as other popular sites that you may visit. I would recommend you use another computer to download a free AV solution like Microsoft Security Essentials or Avast and then install on your computer to clean it up.
So for now, remember if its to good to be true, it usually is.
Security Bloggers Meet Up Website.
If you going to be in the Earls Court London area on the 27th April, and your a security blogger, then the Security Bloggers Meet Up is going to be the place to be.
An excellent time was had by all last year around the same time as RSA, and I hope this event to be as good if not better.
So if your interested, check out the site and follow as this progresses and register your interest.
Hopefully see you there.
























